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VOLUME 125 FEBRUARY 2012 NUMBER4 
I HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
C 2oz2 by The Harvan:l Law Review Association 
IN TRIBUTE: FRANK I. MICHELMAN 
The editors of the Harvard Law Review respectfully dedicate this 
issue to Professor Frank I. Michelman. 
Judge Guido Calahresi* 
It is easy to write a tribute to Frank Michelman. It is extremely 
difficult to write a tribute to Frank Michelman. It is easy because su-
perlatives flow readily and appropriately. It is difficult because, if 
judged by the standards Frank applies to his own work, whatever one 
writes is bound to fall short. 
I first got to know Frank in 1969, when I spent a year visiting 
Harvard Law School. He had been given tenure relatively recently 
and was already recognized as a rising star. Shortly before the fall 
term began, then-Dean Derek Bok gathered the faculty at a resort in 
the Berkshires to talk about the issues that might come up during a 
year that all expected would be marked by University-wide unrest. It 
was an odd event; I had not expected my Harvard visit to begin by be-
ing made to play volleyball with Louis Loss, the great securities 
scholar and perhaps the only Yale Law School graduate then on the 
Harvard Law faculty. The meetings and the topics discussed were, on 
the whole, tedious though probably necessary. What made them 
worthwhile, however, were Frank's occasional interventions. Gently, 
profoundly, but often shockingly, for a law school faculty which was 
not at that time accustomed to public expressions of disagreement, 
Frank probed and questioned, thereby making Derek's uncertain en-
deavor truly useful. He showed even then what a university citizen is 
and should be. 
• Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and Sterling Professor 
of Law Emeritus and Professorial Lecturer, Yale Law School. 
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At the end of the fall term, we got teaching evaluations from the 
students. I was pleased with mine, and said so to Frank while asking 
him how he had done. He gave me his to read, and they were splen-
did. Before I could congratulate him, however, he turned to me, with 
that expression full of concern that, from time to time, we have all seen 
him have, and said: "There are some students out there I haven't 
reached, whom I have not been able to teach." He was referring to the 
inevitable two or three whom he had not been able to inspire. Acting 
as an older colleague (despite my own youth), I pompously told Frank 
that the problem was certainly the students' own, and not Frank's 
teaching, adding that only two or three unhappy souls in the huge 
Harvard classes of the time was amazingly good. But he would have 
none of it. It was his responsibility to connect with every single stu-
dent. And if he didn't succeed in that, he had, to some extent, failed. 
He understood, from the start, what a true teacher should strive for. 
And then there was his review article of my first book, The Costs of 
Accidents. 1 Back then, the book seemed quite novel. Other reviewers, 
though perhaps respectful, did not fully understand it. Some, like 
Richard Posner, ultimately did. But in 1970 he began his review with 
a celebrated and, in retrospect from him, a quite laughable sentepce. 
"Torts is not my field. But in one sense neither is it Guido Calabre-
si's ... ,"2 thereby expressing his doubts about the book's willingness 
to use economics to examine a traditional common law subject. 
Frank, instead, got what I was trying to do right from the start, and 
immediately pushed the quest further. His highly original application 
of my approach, to his own field of property,3 not only deepened, by a 
lot, what I had tried to do but also altered once and for ·an how crucial 
aspects of property law would be analyzed. It also led to further writ-
ings on my own part, and especially to Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral (with A. Douglas 
Melamed),4 a piece, written during my Harvard year, that derives di-
rectly from Frank, and that has itself spurred a huge literature. 
I mention his great influence on me, though, not out of Guido-
centeredness, nor even out of respect for his friendship to me. I note 
it, rather, as an example, because his unfailing insights have been at 
the core of any number of similar exchanges with other scholars, and 
of analogous developments in all of his fields of work: legal theory, 
constitutional law, and property. In each of these his contributions 
have particular characteristics. They always understand the whole 
1 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
2 Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 636 (1970). 
3 Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's 
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971) (book review). 
4 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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field and are respectful of what other people are trying to do, no mat-
ter how critical of their positions he may be. They are willing to use 
other disciplines, whether economics, philosophy, or whatever, with 
great skill while never becoming slave to them or to their often un(or-
tunate self-imposed limits. They are truly original in. the sense that 
they not only advance the field but also add something that will sur-
vive all of us. And they are stated in a way that may seem humble, 
because it bespeaks an ever-present generosity of spirit, but is actually, 
and at the same time, devastatingly powerful. In short, Frank is, if 
possible, an even greater scholar than he is a citizen and teacher. 
But there is more, he is also a marvelous friend; one who under-
stands what genuine friendship means. And it is with this in mind 
that, on this milestone, I say to Frank what Cicero wrote in De Amici-
tia, "Ad Multos Annos!" 
Judge Dennis Davis* 
On February rs, r995, the South African Constitutional Court 
convened to hear its first case. Two weeks earlier, on January 23, 
1995, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies hosted a seminar on critical 
issues relating to the bill of rights chapter of the newly drafted Consti-
tution.1 A panel of constitutional experts from the United States had 
been invited to facilitate these discussions. The leader of this group 
was Frank Michelman. The timing of the event could hardly have 
been more appropriate to the challenges facing the court. 
It was Frank Michelman 's first visit to South Africa. The seminar 
had been born out of an initiative between the Centre for Applied Le-
gal Studies and Professor Karl Klare of Northeastern Law School. 
Professor Klare had insisted that the panel should be led by an in-
fluential constitutional theorist - a "big name." Frank Michelman 
was that "big name" and, thankfully, had little hesitation in accepting 
an offer to make the long trip to South Africa. Thus began Frank Mi-
chelman 's significant commitment to the development of a progressive 
constitutional jurisprudence for South Africa. 
At this meeting Michelman was asked to speak about constitutional 
interpretation to an audience that included all of the newly appointed 
judges of the Constitutional Court, together with many who would 
• Judge President of the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa (hon.); Professor of Law, 
University of Cape Town. 
1 S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993. 
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later appear as counsel before the court and others who would go on to 
write about the developing jurisprudence. 
Although cautious about assuming "the role of instructor," Michel-
man provided some prescient advice. He warned against an uncritical 
acceptance of a strain of American constitutional theory that sought to 
construe the rights enshrined in a constitution to pertain exclusively to 
democratic process and procedure as opposed to the promotion of 
some form of morality and social justice. He suggested that the South 
African Bill of Rights 
may be much more strongly meant than was ours to serve as an opening 
towards a fundamentally reconceived society: a signpost along the road 
towards a revolutionized future. A future still to be chartered. And char-
tered in part through a process of law - that is, constitutional adjudica-
tion - that progressively instills concrete meaning into abstract rights 
statements with a view to realizing in actuality, in the lives of all people, 
in the still-and-for some-time-yet-to-come unfolding conditions of the new 
South African nation, the basic human interests for which the rights-
statements stand as markers and commitments. 2 
Within the context, this was a bold argument. Consider the au-
dience to which Michelman was addressing these remarks. Although 
the vast majority of lawyers in the room had fought tenaciously and 
often heroically against the racism, sexism, and general oppression of 
apartheid, all had been schooled in Westminster-style constitutional 
law and educated predominantly through the prism of a formalist-
positivist approach to jurisprudence. Michelman was arguing way 
beyond the obvious, namely that the new Constitution was meant to 
represent a majestic commitment to a future based on the foundational 
values enshrined in the text: freedom, equality, and human dignity. He 
was seeking to persuade the newly appointed judges and the constitu-
tional bar that it was the task of judges through law in general and 
constitutional adjudication in particular to pave the road toward this 
"revolutionized future." Here was a call to a transformative constitu-
tional jurisprudence in which the challenges of substantive social jus-
tice would not be subordinated to democratic process and procedure. 
In the same lecture, Michelman spoke both of the constraints im-
posed upon the judiciary by the constitutional text, which provided 
them with the power of judicial review, as well as the challenge to 
judges in historically developing constitutional systems to lift their 
gaze beyond the text and toward an animating view informed by "their 
own educated and considered sense of 'general ends' by which the 
contemporary nation finds itself able to claim a unifying sense of col-
2 Frank I. Michelman, A Constitutional Conversation with Professor Frank Michelman, u S. 
AFR.]. HUM. RTS. 477, 480 (1995). 
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lective or shared purpose, or moral character, or national identity or 
political coherence. "3 
Reading this lecture more than fifteen years after it was given, I am 
struck by its perceptive relevance to South African adjudicators who 
were about to commence the difficult journey toward a constitutional 
democracy from a still dominant societal position of racism, sexism, 
and unaccountable authority. With these remarks Frank Michelman 
began his own journey, or yet another in his own illustrious career: a 
sustained and creative engagement with the development of South 
African constitutional jurisprudence and its attempt to create sign 
posts along the road toward a revolutionized future. Many articles 
and presentation of seminars in South Africa have followed: far too 
many to mention. 
Suffice to refer to his latest offering, Liberal Constitutionalism, 
Property Rights and the Assault on Poverty.4 Here Michelman returns 
to the field of property law in which he has so distinguished himself. 
The object of this article is particularly challenging: an engagement 
with the challenges of constitutionalism and social justice, in particular 
whether a liberal constitutionalist transformative project will invaria-
bly be incongruent with a national project of distributive recovery 
from colonial and post-colonial injustice. In response, he provides a 
compelling justification to why South Africa was ill advised to include 
a property protection clause in the Constitution5 and, in particular, the 
provision "no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. "6 In an at-
tempt to redress the problem caused by this provision, Michelman con-
tends that if the word arbitrary were substituted with the word "un-
fair," it might be possible to reconcile that which would otherwise be a 
range of defensive property rights with a transformative constitution. 
He argues further that, even if a new form of politics dictated that a 
liberaVpost-liberal constitution would prevent the recovery of social 
justice, the transformation of the economy and polity would still have 
to be carried out responsibly and its adverse impact upon society 
would have to be minimized. In this way, he forces a careful consider-
ation of a form of politics that may replace a liberaVpost-constitutional 
project but remains faithful to a commitment to a society based upon 
freedom, equality, and dignity. 
3 Id. at 485. 
4 Frank I. Michelman, Liberal Constitutionalism, Property Rights and the Assault on Pover-
ty, 23 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library). 
5 S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, § 25(1). 
6 Id. 
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Over a sixteen-year period of engagement with the South African 
constitutional project, Michelman has interrogated both the possibili-
ties and limitations of progressive constitutionalism. His writings have 
consistently revealed a keen awareness of the dangers of constitutional 
fundamentalism and the problems of replacing politics with a juris-
tocracy, while simultaneously challenging judges to instill concrete 
meaning into abstract rights claims so as to constitute a society based 
on substantive social justice for all. 
This brief summation of Frank's contribution to South Africa does 
little justice to its full impact, which has been felt within both the ju-
diciary and the academy. When in I 995, as the director of the Centre 
for Applied Legal Studies, I issued an invitation to Frank Michelman 
to facilitate the discussion on critical constitutional issues together with 
his colleagues, I hardly imagined that the South African legal commu-
nity would have enjoyed so sustained and challenging a contribution 
to the development of South African law over the past sixteen years. 
South African lawyers can only hope that he will continue to make a 
similar contribution, for at least another sixteen years! 
Rosalind Dixon• 
"Rash." That is what I recall Frank Michelman writing on a draft 
of mine when I was a graduate student working with him at Harvard 
Law School (HLS). Now, rash is something that Frank himself dis-
tinctly is not: witness forty years of the most careful, rigorous study by 
Frank of the status of "welfare" or socioeconomic rights in constitu-
tional law, 1 or his continuous probing over almost as long of the rela-
tionship between constitutional law and liberal ideals of political legi-
timacy. 2 So you can imagine that I was worried - really worried -
• Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School; Senior V1Siting Fellow, University of 
New South Wales Faculty of Law. 
I See, e.g., FRANK I. MICHELMAN, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining 
America Away, 6 lNT'L J. CONST. L. 663 (2008) [hereinafter Michelman, Explaining America 
Away]; Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 
INT'L J. CONST. L. 13 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Social Rights]; Frank I. Michelman, Wel-
fare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 [hereinafter Michelman, Wel-
fare Rights]; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1¢8 Tenn - ForewO?'d: On Protecting the 
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) [hereinafter Michelman, 
Protecting the Poor]. · 
2 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (2005); Frank I. Michelman, 
The Supreme Courl, 1985 Tenn - Foreword: '.n-aces of Seif-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1986). 
2012] FRANK I. MICHELMAN 885 
by the prospect that I had finally fallen down in the department that, 
as a student of Frank's, perhaps matters most: the thinking department. 
There is certainly no shame as a student of Frank Michelman in re-
thinking things. Frank is one of the leading exemplars in the Ameri-
can legal academy today of what it means to keep on thinking about, 
and thus rethinking, one's own ideas.3 But there is definitely still the 
possibility in the Michelman school of, if not shame (Frank might 
want to rule out deliberately inducing that kind of response in his stu-
dents on liberal, dignity-respecting-type grounds!4), then serious disap-
pointment if one does not think long and hard about the kinds of ques-
tions that matter most to Frank (questions, for example, about what 
constitutions can and do actually do in the world, and how and why 
they matter). 
So you can also imagine how relieved I was when, after reading 
and re-reading my draft for several hours in search of the relevant 
(rash) words, it finally dawned on me that Frank was actually correct-
ing an error in one of my footnotes: the case I was referring to, Frank 
was pointing out to me, was the voting rights case Carrington v. Rash,5 
not Rush. ("Rushed" footnotes, not rash thought, were thus my failing 
on this occasion.) The locus of criticism took me by surprise, because I 
wasn't expecting someone as distinguished as Frank actually to read 
my footnotes - or, at least, not in that kind of careful detail! But 
that, I discovered, was to make a quite fundamental mistake about the 
kind of scholar Frank is. 
Frank might well be a brilliant thinker about abstract questions of 
political justice, but Frank is definitely not an abstract thinker, if what 
one means by that is someone who floats above the nitty-gritty detail 
of constitutional text and doctrine. Frank knows constitutional law 
better than almost anyone - in the United States and South Africa in 
particular, but also in a great many other countries, given his role in 
advising graduate students from around the world, and his increasing-
ly global readership. 6 And it is also in no small part because of this 
3 Compare, e.g., Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note r, and Michelman, Welfare 
Rights, supra note r, with Michelman, Social Rights, supra note r, and Michelman, Explaining 
America Away, supra noter. 
4 See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND 
THE LAW (2004). 
5 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
6 Frank's work has, for example, been published, or translated with additional commentary 
from Frank, in recent years into Chinese, Czech, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Span-
ish, among other languages. 
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expertise that, in recent years, Frank has become one of the leading 
"outside" voices on South African constitutional law. 7 
Another feature of Frank's intellectual outlook that explains this 
quite remarkable influence on South African constitutionalism is his 
commitment to "dialogue. "8 Dialogue is a concept that preoccupied me 
during my time working with Frank as a student at HLS, and which I 
have continued (inspired by Frank, of course) to think hard about 
since, as an Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago Law 
School. But Frank's idea of dialogue has a much longer pedigree, and 
indeed a simpler meaning, than do the ideas about interbranch consti-
tutional cooperation I have been focused on: dialogue, for Frank, is 
simply the dictionary-type definition of the idea, namely an intellectual 
"colloquy" or "[v]erbal interchange of thought between two or more per-
sons. 119 Frank has also brought exactly this kind of spirit - of respect-
ful intellectual exchange - to bear in all his scholarly interactions, in-
cluding those with foreign students, judges and constitution-makers. 
When Frank engages in "constitutional conversation," it is certainly 
no mere exchange of constitutional pleasantries. 10 There is always 
some new argument, or perspective, to offer; and very often, a quite 
direct challenge to the audience's prior constitutional thinking. The 
challenge is also invariably powerful. For me, it was certainly conver-
sations with Frank that first helped "shake up" my (particular Austra-
lian-style) formalist notions of the proper role of judges, and courts, 
under a constitution. 11 (Chicago, of course, has helped continue the 
process.) And for many South African constitutionalists, I suspect, en-
counters with Frank have had a similar effect. 12 
In challenging others in this way, however, Frank has also shown a 
deep humility about his own position as a constitutional outsider. "I 
tread on ground that for me must be uncertain," he has insisted to 
South Africans in talking about the relevance of American constitu-
tional insights: "[l]t will be up to you," he tells them, "to say for your-
selves how far what I suggest may be correct. "13 He has also shown 
profound respect for his conversation partners, as themselves capable 
7 For discussion of this concept, see, for example, Rosalind Dixon & Vicki Jackson, "Extra-
Turritorial" Constitutional Interpretation: Outsider Interventions in Domestic Constitutional Con-
tests (2ou) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
8 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 2; Michelman, Social Rights, supra note 1. 
9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://oed.com (enter "dialogue"; then click "Find 
Word") (emphasis added). 
10 See Frank I. Michelman, A Constitutional Conversation with Professor Frank Michelman, 
II S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 477 (1995) [hereinafter Michelman, Constitutional Conversation]. 
11 This is the wonderful metaphor Frank employs in describing what is lacking in Dworkin 's 
monologic, as opposed to dialogic, conception of the role of Hercules as a judge. See Michelman, 
supra note 2, at 76. 
12 See, e.g., Michelman, Constitutional Conversation, supra note 10, at 48o-81. 
13 Id. at 480. 
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of offering reciprocal insights about American constitutional law. 14 It 
is no wonder, then, that South Africans - like constitutionalists 
around the world - have continually sought out Frank as a partner in 
thinking through hard questions of domestic constitutional design and 
interpretation. 
This same commitment to dialogue has also been extremely signifi-
cant for those of us who were his students at HLS. Frank has had 
some pretty distinguished conversation partners over the years (includ-
ing, of course, the likes of Professors John Rawls and Jurgen Haber-
mas), so an invitation from Frank to engage in conversation carries a 
powerful symbolic message: the door really is open if you have some-
thing valuable to say. Hearing this message, I suspect, has had a sig-
nificant impact on the scholarly path of many of those who, like me, 
came to HLS as "foreigners," and left as scholars of comparative con-
stitutional law within the American academy. H comparative constitu-
tional law gains a secure place as a field in the United States in the 
years to come, 15 therefore, I believe it really will be in no small part 
due to Frank - or the Michelman school of serious thinking, and in-
tellectual exchange, across (all) borders. 
Dieter Grimm• 
When I arrived at Harvard Law School as an LL.M. student from 
Germany long ago, Frank Michelman was already there as a teacher. 
I checked it in my yearbook of 1964-1965. The text explains why I 
did not take classes with Frank at that time. He taught property and 
local government, no subjects of particular interest to me. Over the 
last decades we have witnessed a number of epistemological turns in 
the academic world: the cultural turn, the iconographic turn, and so 
forth. At a certain point Frank's constitutional turn must have oc-
curred. From that moment on I followed his writings. For me they 
14 See, e.g., id. at 477; see also Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitu-
tional AntidiscTimination Law in the United States and South Africa, u7 HARV. L. REV. 1378 
(2004). 
15 For the recent renaissance of the field in the academy, see, for example, A.E. Dick Howard, 
A 1raveler from an Antique Land: The Modem Renaissance of Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 
VA. J. INT'L L. 3 (2009). But for controversy surrounding the field in a judicial context, see, for 
example, Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: The United States Constitution and 
Intemational Law, 98 AM. J, INT'L L. 42 (2004). 
• Professor of Law, Humboldt University Berlin; Former Justice, Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany; Former Rector, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Institute for Advanced Study; 
and Honorary Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
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differed from the majority of American constitutional scholarship by 
their philosophical foundations. I think it is fair to say that it was 
Frank who acquainted American law schools with John Rawls's work 
and also with Jtirgen Habermas. Frank's discourse with Habermas 
(who had his own constitutional turn with Between Facts and Norms 
of 1992) belongs to the highlights of recent philosophical-constitutional 
debates. In addition, I see Frank among the leaders of a republican 
turn in U.S. constitutional law, a turn away from the predominant 
concern with rights to public will formation, which also brought him 
close to Habermas and his insistence on the idea that the submission of 
citizens to the law can be justified only if they are at the same time the 
authors of the law. 
A few years ago I had the privilege to introduce Frank when he 
gave a speech at the American Academy in Berlin. Before preparing 
my introduction I asked some of my Yale colleagues how Frank is re-
garded in U.S. academic circles. One of them answered: he is ".the 
voice of human decency" in American constitutional law - a reputa-
tion that he earned mainly by his reinterpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a protection of the poor, 1 one of two Forewords he 
wrote to the Harvard Law Review. This coincided with an under-
standing that brought him closer to European constitutional law the-
ory than most American constitutionalists. 
In general Frank is one of the American scholars who early devel-
oped a considerable interest in comparative constitutional law in a 
spirit of openness and curiosity. I think that our contacts became more 
intensive because of our shared interest in the seminal development of 
constitutionalism in South Africa after the end of the apartheid regime. 
We were both engaged in discussions about the role jurists had played 
in the old times in South Africa and how they should account for their 
behavior as a professional group, I at that time less so as an academic 
than as a justice of the German Constitutional Court, which served as 
a model for South Africa. The members of the South African Consti-
tutional Court, immediately after having been appointed by President 
Nelson Mandela, traveled to Germany to discuss questions of constitu-
tional adjudication with the members of the German court for a full 
week. When Frank and I taught a course in comparative constitu-
tional law together at Harvard in the fall term of 2008, I could often 
observe the difficulty some of our students had when I tried to explain 
notions and methods of the German or European constitutional mind-
set. In situations like these Frank showed an extraordinary ability to 
translate what I tried to communicate in a way that it simultaneously 
1 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Tenn - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). 
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became understandable but kept its otherness. This is why Frank is 
regarded in many parts of the world as a bridge builder between dif-
ferent legal systems - not the smallest of his merits in a globalizing 
world where more knowledge of foreign law and more mutual under-
standing are inevitable. 
Patrick 0. Cud.ridge* 
We all know how lucky we are - those of us who have had the 
chance to engage Frank Michelman, in class or indeed in any mode of 
serious talk. 1 He is so attentive to the matter at hand, so conscious of 
the sequence of steps needing to be taken, and at the same time so 
democratic in his approach, welcoming of our involvement, careful 
and encompassing in his responses to our reactions and suggestions. 
We are raised up. We become collaborators in the given project, share 
in its ambition and its accomplishment. 
* * * 
Frank Michelman is also over-the-top smart. Thirty years ago, 
Robert Ellickson - no slouch himself2 - ruefully put the point more 
formally: "No law professor has greater analytic power and intellectual 
range. "3 Michelman 's work indeed encompasses so many topics closely 
considered, so frequently and variously published, its sheer prolifera-
tion daunts. We may well wonder about our capacity to grasp it at 
large, assess it at all close to whole. The pertinent Harvard web page, 
the last time I visited it, listed only two books (ignoring translated 
compilations) - Brennan and Democracy,4 and the celebrated Gov-
ernment in Urban Areas casebook,5 a collaborative work with Ter-
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, University of Miami. 
I The first time I encountered Frank Michelman he was imitating a process server on the last 
day of Richard Field's civil procedure class (Field was retiring at the end of the semester) -
theater both sentimental and surreal. Later on, I was lucky enough to serve as sidekick in Justice 
Brennan's seminar at the University of Miami in 1991 and 1992. Frank- along with Owen Fiss 
and Larry Tribe - was a principal recurring participant in the series of extraordinary conversa-
tions Brennan orchestrated, occasions of great good humor and affection, occasions also for teach-
ing of the highest order. 
2 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991). 
3 Robert C. Ellickson, A Reply to Michelman and Fmg, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1602, 1602 (1982). 
4 FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999). 
5 FRANK I. MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (1970). 
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ranee Sandalow. But there are also 45 or so book chapters, and u3 
articles.6 Read all of this? It is a too-great mound of writing, a moun-
tain really. Mont Frank. 
Michelman has had to address this problem himself. Brennan and 
Democracy is a greatly interesting book in part precisely because J us-
tice Brennan's legacy piles even higher - 1360 opinions,7 obviously 
too many to take up together - and therefore the question of traverse, 
of which approach and what path, is inescapably front and center. 
The first chapter provocatively only occasionally discusses Justice 
Brennan's own formulations. Michelman begins with Alexander 
Bickel and the familiar countermajoritarian difficulty, sets some of 
Ronald Dworkin 's ideas about right constitutional content as one form 
of response, finds in the more process-focused work of Robert Post an 
alternative, but treating each tack as incomplete, proposes another 
way forward. What matters in assessing the democratic warrant of 
constitutional adjudication is whether interpretations of constitutional 
precepts work to encourage and maintain a legal order open at every 
level "to the full blast of the sundry opinions on the question of the 
rightness of one or another interpretation" - "having your own 
opinions and interest-articulations registered," their value in some real 
sense acknowledged as "helping the process toward the right answer, a 
value that you will not self-respectingly suppose to be less than equal 
to that of other people's."8 
At bottom, it should be apparent, the criteria to be used in assess-
ing constitutional interpretations - the tests of registry and acknowl-
edgement - must be preoccupied with both conceptions of substantive 
fairness and access to governmental processes, conjoin Dworkin and 
Post, and take into consideration both the "impress" and "press" of al-
ternative views.9 This path through or past Bickel's difficulty be-
comes the guideway across the Brennan corpus. Michelman 's second 
chapter further details the route, overlaying the idea of "romantic libe-
ralism," a gloss borrowed in part from Professor Roberto Unger, 
highlighting hazards posed by seemingly anodyne notions of tradition 
and community. "Everyone . . . has reason to welcome confrontation 
and challenge of his or her accustomed or habitual ways and values, 
from all quarters known and unknown."10 For Brennan, "political 
6 See Frank I. Michelman, Bibliography, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard 
.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=43&sh&show=bibliography (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). 
7 See MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 138 (quoting David H. Souter, In Memoriam: William J. 
Brennan, Jr., III HARV. L. REV. 11 1-2 (1997)). 
8 MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 5g--60. For an extended, appreciative discussion of this part 
of Michelman 's analysis, see Mark Tushnet, Resolving the Paradox of Democratic Constitutional-
ism?, J GREEN BAG 225 (2000). 
9 MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 61-62. 
10 Id. at 70-71. 
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freedom meant unprejudiced, emancipated access for all to the contes-
tations of democratic public life. "11 Judicial review thus acquires "its 
own partisan cause," its own distinctive agenda, becomes "an edifice of 
liberal political prudence, not a logical entailment. "12 
This map marches Michelman and his readers to some well-known 
vistas - for example, NAACP v. Button13 and its emphasis on "law's 
essentially fluid and contestable character";14 Texas v. Johnson 15 and 
the question of respect for "agitation and eccentricity";16 Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Missouri Department of Health 11 and the debate about state in-
terests over and above individual interests;18 and Michael H. 'V. Gerald 
D. 19 and the argument as to the role of tradition in constitutional anal-
ysis.20 And there are notable unexpected visits - the discussion of 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n21 is just one example.22 
But surprisingly, the hike moves quickly past or bypasses entirely oth-
er famous stops - for example, Baker v. Carr23 (on which Justice 
Brennan and Frank Michelman as law clerk worked together!); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan;24 Goldberg v. Kelly;25 Eisenstadt v. 
Baird;26 Craig v. Boren;21 and Plyler v. Doe.28 
What are we to make of this idiosyncratic tour? In a way, Brennan 
and Democracy is reminiscent of John Ely's Democracy and Distrust,29 
famously prompted by Ely's admiration of Chief Justice Warren and 
his great efforts.30 . But unlike Ely, Michelman does not try to cele-
brate through distillation and generalization. Just as plainly, Michel-
man is uninterested in the treatise form, reinvigorated by Laurence 
Tribe in American Constitutional Law31 - even though Brennan's 
huge body of work might easily support such a project. Brennan and 
11 Id. at 120-21. 
12 Id. at 134-35. 
13 371 U.S. 416 (1963). 
14 MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 72; see id. at 72-74. 
15 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
16 MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 78. 
17 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
18 See MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 92--95. 
19 491 U.S. II0 (1989). 
20 See MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 100-08. 
21 493 U.S. 4II (1990). 
22 See MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 7g-81. 
23 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
24 376 U.S. 254 (1964i 
25 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
26 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
27 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
28 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
29 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
3o See John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. I l (1974). 
3l LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1978). 
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Democracy instead presents Brennan alongside Dworkin and Post and 
quite a few other academics and Justices, all equally participant, each 
individually distinct. And alongside Frank Michelman too: it is after 
all Michelman who takes up the work of each contributor in turn, ap-
preciatively pulls out what he judges to be the pertinent elements, and 
places each in relation to the others. And it is Michelman himself, of 
course, who through this process develops the distinctive idea of dem-
ocratic representation and its concomitants that Justice Brennan's 
work (and that of all the others) we come to see as exemplifying -
within Brennan and Democracy anyway.32 
The form of Michelman's book, its display of "composite orders,"33 
is an endorsement of its substance, an illustration of the rewards in 
contingent, sometimes tense conjunctions of complex ideas and indi-
viduals. It is also proof of strategy, evidence of a workable way of ap-
proaching huge accumulations - Brennan's corpus, or American con-
stitutional law at large, or indeed law generally - considered both as 
wholes and as in process variously assembling. We glimpse too a 
sketch of Frank Michelman's mountain - heterogeneous and com-
plex, nonetheless fractally elaborating, organized and organizing. Fi-
nally, we recognize that this massif comes into view only virtually, as 
it were, as it is appropriated, however tumbled, inside our own efforts. 
Michelman 's works, like ours and like the efforts of the writers he 
reads - Brennan, Bickel, Dworkin, Post, Rawls, Habermas, the 
rest - are pushed out and up as they are glimpsed, grasped, and put 
to use: become like landscape, geology, and cultural production 
simultaneously. 
* * * 
Ranges, not just mountains here and there - caught up in our par-
ticular projects, their juxtapositions and scrutinies, we even so come to 
recognize major peaks. 
Mont Frank.34 
32 Throughout his career, Frank Michelman has made heavy use of the juxtaposition and close 
critical reading of the important work of other writers in order to situate and sharpen his own 
perspective - indeed, Michelman may have employed this device more often and more centrally 
than other prominent constitutional theorists. This is not the occasion, of course, for any tho-
rough survey. For a thorough survey of Michelman 's scholarship, see, for example, Legal Scholar-
ship Symposium: The Scholarship of Frank I. Michelman, 39 TULSA L. REV. 457 (2004). For ex-
amples early and late, see, for example, Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation 
Access Fees: The Right to Protect One'.s Rights - Part r, 197 3 DUKE L.J. 1153; Franlifurt Lecture 
Ill: Frank I. Michelman, The Case .of Liberty, NORMATIVE ORDERS, http:/lwww.normative 
orders.net/en/news/headlines/416-frankfurt-lecture-iii-frank-i-michelman. 
33 See generally STUART CURRAN, POETIC FORM AND BRITISH ROMANTICISM (1986). 
34 Cf. Ferdinand Hodler, LAKE GENEVA AND MONT BLANC WITH PINK CLOUDS (1916), 
available at http:/lwww.flickr.coinlphotos/centralasian/5687448013/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). 
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Martha Minow* 
Shake off all the fears of servile prejudices, under which weak minds are 
servilely crouched. Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call on her tribunal 
for every fact, every opinion. 
- Thomas Jefferson 1 
What law review pages can best honor a superb scholar whose 
own words have memorably enlivened so many pages of this 
and so many other scholarly publications? It will not do to simply list 
and admire Frank Michelman's pathbreaking works on constitutional 
law and theory, comparative constitutional law, property law, 
and poverty law which are read and studied across the world in En-
glish and in Chinese, Czech, French, Italian, German, and Portuguese. 
Nor is it sufficient - though it is crucial - to note his extraordinary 
capacity to span the most practical and the most theoretical. Justices 
at the United States Supreme Court and other constitutional courts re-
ly on his work. The American Philosophical Society awarded 
Frank its Henry M. Phillips Prize in Jurisprudence; an interlocutor 
for John Rawls and Jilrgen Habermas, he pays no less attention to 
the arguments and questions from scores of students and scholars, 
earning passionate devotion. South Africans acknowledge his 
pivotal role as interlocutor and advisor to drafters of their 
post-apartheid constitution. All of this is remarkable and commenda-
ble. Yet Frank's superb work and career, I think, call for 
more than recitation of accomplishments. Instead, the best tribute, 
I think, is engagement, in kind, asking good questions and wrestling 
with them always with one foot in theory and another foot in 
practice, attending to real consequences, in real contexts, in a messy 
world. 
For Frank Michelman asks great questions. He also pursues 
them with care to illuminate not only all sides of an issue, but 
as many levels of analysis as reasons can reveal. In his hands, 
the question "May a private university act against racially 
stigmatizing speech on campus?"2 becomes a subtle and self-
reflective analysis of doctrinal legal arguments, the dynamics between 
• Dean and Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School. 
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. IO, 1787), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS 902 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
2 Frank I. Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay for 
the ACLU, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339,356 (1992). 
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courts and legislatures, and the possibility that universities consider 
becoming places that make democracy a daily practice enough to war-
rant potential exception from an across-the-board ban on censorship, 
folded into a savvy assessment of how courts, legislatures, and uni-
versities are unlikely to pursue the options demanding the most of 
them.3 
In his now-classic 1969 Foreword to the Haruard Law Review's 
Supreme Court issue - in the midst of judicial consideration of War 
on Poverty policies - Frank enacted his hope that "propounding such 
questions might affect the elaboration of constitutional rights pertain-
ing to the status of being poor. "4 He presciently asked whether a focus 
on the hazards in an unequal society would better serve the courts 
than would a focus on avoiding extreme unequal treatment, thereby 
anticipating the turn to preoccupation with classification that has, 
from the perspective of some, taken constitutional adjudication away 
from inquiries into justice.5 
So, here's my question: what is the method Frank Michelman 
adopts - and what does it teach about law and life? 
Evident in Frank Michelman 's work is his insistence on 
digging beneath the familiar and the unexamined.6 Equally present 
is his persistence in subjecting his own initial arguments to renewed 
scrutiny. 7 His analysis might travel through geometry, 8 political 
3 Id. at 350-53, 355-62, 367-69. 
4 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Tenn - FurewoTd: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 16 (1969). 
s With the classification focus in equal protection treatments of race, the United States Su-
preme Court has turned away from constitutional deliberation over the status of being poor. See 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4u U.S. 1 (1973). See generally Frank I. Michelman, 
Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and 
South Africa, u7 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination 
and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Stmggles Over Brown, u7 HARV. L. REV. 1470 
(2004). 
6 E.g., Frank I. Michelman, Postmodemism, Proceduralism, and Constitutional Justice: A 
Comment on van der Walt and Botha, 9 CONSTELLATIONS 246, 246 (2002) (''Maybe we think we 
all agree on the most basic guaranties of human rights that compose our constitutional bills of 
rights, such as guaranties of equality of citizenship and freedoms of conscience and expression. 
But what is it, then, that we agree on?"). 
7 Thus, in 2002, he wrote, "The constraint of public reason - the guarantee that the right 
questions, at least, will be posed and sincerely debated - itself thus becomes one of the constitu-
tional essentials." Frank I. Michelman, The Problem of Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement: 
Can "Discourses of Application" Help?, in HABERMAS AND PRAGMATISM 112, 122 (Mitchell 
Aboulafia et al. eds., 2002). Commenting on these words four years later, he wrote, "Well, what 
spirit? What right questions?" Frank I. Michelman, Unenumerated Rights Under Popular Consti-
tutionalis11!, 9 u. PA. J. CONST. L. 121, 151 (2006). 
8 Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOM-
ICS, AND THE LAW 3, 14 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (comparing oblong 
subdivisions with honeycomb clusters to explore the social relations and negotiations likely to re-
sult from different land-planning patterns in allocating property). 
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philosophy,9 economics, 10 or psychology,11 but it will always press 
for reasons and justifications; indeed, Frank's gifts include often 
making better versions of the arguments with which he disagrees than 
do his opponents. Frank probes and insists on dialogue, imbuing 
analysis of ideas with deep understanding of the human beings who 
form and live with them. Indeed, the commitment to dialogue is so 
pervasive that it informs Frank's prose style12 and his constitutional 
theory. 13 
In this vein, a truly remarkable document captures Frank's com-
ments when he led a team of constitutional experts from the United 
States in a journey to South Africa to discuss issues related to that na-
tion's interim Constitution. In A Constitutional Conversation with 
Professor Frank Michelman, 14 Frank explains that the discussion can-
not involve one-way instruction by the scholars from the United States 
who lack the knowledge and involvement of South Africans in the 
project of constitutional work. 15 Frank further notes that the U.S. 
scholars could share knowledge of judicial behavior and conventional 
modes of legal interpretation but that successful legal interpretation 
would require appraisal of consequences "in the light of an emergent 
national sense of justice to which the interpretations are themselves, 
recursively, contributing."16 
Sharing this sense that law is enacted not discovered, even as it re-
flects a conception of justice unfolding in part through the legal acts of 
interpretation, Frank's comments to that group in South Africa also 
show how the effects of engagement with South African lawyers af-
9 E.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justifica-
tion, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 13 (2003); Frank I. Michelman, Machiavelli in Robes? The Court in 
the Election, in THE LONGEST NIGHT. POLEMICS AND PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTION 2000, 
256 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2002). 
10 Frank I. Michelman, Microeconomic Appraisal of Constitutional Law: A Methodological 
Preface, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 137 (Daniel 
Rubinfeld ed., 1979). 
1l Frank I. Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 241 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
12 See Frank I. Michelman, The Subject of Liberalism, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1833 (1994) 
(discussing how a reading of John Rawls' Political Liberalism can be useful for instruction on 
ethical wisdom, he writes that "[t]he challenge is to divest yourself, if you can, of belief that con-
stitutional democracy is, in fact, the right form of political ordering for you and your kind. Noth-
ing in Rawls's argument would require you to answer the question that obviously now looms: 
whether (for this purpose) your kind is anything less than the human kind. Nevertheless, you 
might feel some pressure to respond." (footnote omitted)). 
13 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Tenn - Foreword: 1Taces of Self. 
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 76-77 (1986). 
14 II SOUTH AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 477 (1995). 
15 Id. at478. 
16 Id. at 485. 
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fected his own understanding of American law.17 For he further tells 
his South African interlocutors that the visiting Americans come from 
a legal system that never intended its expression of rights to serve as 
vehicles for general social transformation - but South Africa's might 
do just that. 18 The humility and honesty informing Frank's 
remarks not only indicate hard-won lessons about limitations of court-
based law reform in the United States but also demonstrate why he 
has become so sought after in constitutional discussions across the 
globe. His great personal qualities of generosity, curiosity, and empa-
thy are manifest in his written work, as is his personal commitment to 
stretching and challenging old ideas - including his own. Receptive 
to new theoretical developments, he has become a trusted guide and 
honest critic of Rawlsian theories of justice, critical legal studies, 
feminist legal thought, republicanism, critical race theory, law and 
economics, and Habermasian conceptions of liberalism. Frank noto-
riously improves other people's theories in both his sympathetic and criti-
cal retellings. 
In the context of evaluating whether economic analysis offers a ba-
sis for preferring private property arrangements, Frank concludes one 
article with a statement that exemplifies what makes his work so 
commendable. He writes: "With that provisional view, you might 
want to keep on investigating, rather than considering the matter 
closed."19 There could be no better exemplar of the commitment to us-
ing reason to pursue truth and justice. Honored to salute Frank's ca-
reer, I look forward to continuing to learn with and from his superb 
questions. 
Margaret Jane Radin• 
I came to know Frank Michelman from the printed page. As a 
first-year law student I was unsettled by the all-transaction-costs-all-
the-time approach of my property teacher, and I sought alternatives in 
the library. I came upon Frank Michelman's piece, Property, Utility, and 
17 This paragraph draws on Martha Minow, Just Education: An Essay for Fmnk Michelman, 
39 TULSA L. REV. 54 7 (2004). 
18 Id. at 479. 
19 Michelman, sufwa note 8, at 34. 
• Henry King Ransom Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, and William 
Benjamin Scott & Luna M. Scott Professor emerita, Stanford University. 
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Faimess,1 and as I made my way through his pages, both meticulous 
and passionate, I became a Michelman fan. After reading his article, I 
felt better about welfare theory and property theory in general. It was 
complicated, not simple; it was polytonal, not monotonal; it was open 
ended, not frozen. 
In just a few years, I became a property theorist myself. I cannot 
say that Frank was the cause of my becoming a property teacher, be-
cause honestly, in the beginning it was largely a fluke. I didn't go to 
law school intending to be an academic, but while I was a student, 
academics grabbed and held me, and then a very nice teaching job hit 
me over the head in the spring of I 976 when I was still a 3L. The 
school needed "a woman" to replace "a woman" who had had to with-
draw her acceptance in March, and through a chain of coincidence 
that would seem unrealistic if it showed up in a novel, I got the call. I 
asked the dean for a first-year course, and Property was the one avail-
able, and I took it. 
I do believe, however, that Frank's example of what property 
scholarship could be was a constant inspiration to me as I started to 
learn how to teach and what to write in this field. He remained an in-
spiration even as I found my own niche. I have looked to him always 
as a role model of meticulousness, scholarly integrity, imagination, and 
just plain commitment. 
Little did I know at the time I first read it that Property, Utility, 
and Fairness, published in 1967, was Frank's first big foray into the 
world of scholarship. It became one of the few such works with last-
ing impact. We still use its terms (such as "demoralization costs"), even 
if we have forgotten where they came from; and we have come to un-
derstand more and more, as he asked us to realize then, that not all 
costs are dollar costs, and in fact that many human costs are not. 
I came to know Frank as a person a couple of years after I made 
his acquaintance through his scholarship. In the summer of 1978 I 
participated in a program in legal philosophy at Harvard for a few 
weeks. Because I admired Frank as a scholar, and because at that 
time I had some nascent thoughts running around in my head about 
the relationship of property to personhood, I contacted him and asked 
for an opportunity to speak with him. He invited me to his office. 
There he spent considerable time engaging in discussion about proper-
ty theory with a young scholar unknown to him who hadn't yet pub-
lished anything in that field. 
I think I may not have realized at the time, but certainly do realize 
now - having experienced how pressed for time we academics are 
1 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. u65 (1967). 
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and how little room we have for such meetings with people who show 
up out of the blue - that he was simply astonishingly generous. I 
now know that Frank has always helped other scholars, always been 
astonishingly generous with his time and commitment. I imagine that 
for him, engagement in scholarly dialogue is simply and naturally an 
integral part of being a scholar. This sort of openness to discussion is, 
of course, part of the ideal of scholarly community; but also, of course, 
it is a rare quality to find in practice. It is a character trait, one that 
identifies a true scholar. (And indeed, a true gentleman.) It's particu-
larly significant for me that Frank was especially supportive of women 
scholars, at a time when that was not the norm. 
Frank is also a committed teacher. I don't know how he got a 5 .o 
rating from sixty first-year students the year he visited at Stanford. I 
have often wished I did know. If it was magic, I would have liked to 
replicate it. But maybe it was simply this: the response I have always 
had to his genuine commitment, integrity, meticulousness, articulate-
ness, and deep and broad-ranging knowledge is just the unanimous re-
sponse. (At least sometimes, with those who really want to listen.) 
Frank has a particular sense of humor that I have to call Michel-
manic. As we got to know each other better during the year I visited 
at Harvard (1984-1985), I learned to detect a unique combination of 
irony, passion, and amusement (or perhaps, bemusement). In a pas-
sage I'm fond of quoting, for instance, Frank was aiming to nail home 
an idea (understood since Hobbes but often forgotten): even if one 
supposes that we are all just self-interested maximizers who can never 
trust each other, and thus that we need a strong private property re-
gime, we need a state to organize cooperation because it is in every-
one's self-interest; but nevertheless, it takes cooperation to organize the 
state; and where does this ability to cooperate come from if we are 
perspicuously imagined as trustless self-interested maximizers? Here's 
the passage: 
What is private property ... but a particular form of regulation ... ? But 
then come the questions: Instituted (fashioned, decided upon) by whom? 
Policed and enforced by whom? Obeyed by whom, and why? Because if 
(and only if!) I don't obey, the constable will catch me, the prosecutor try 
me, the magistrate convict me, the sheriff punish me? Who will make 
them? Where can the regress end, if not in uncoerced cooperation, the un-
tragic commons of constitutional practice founded on a "rule" that there is 
no one to enforce but that people on the whole adhere to, though adhe-
rence is in the interest of no one who does not trust that (most) others will 
adhere to it . . . . In other words: no trust, no property. 2 
2 Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETH-
ICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 31 30-31 0. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982), 
reprinted in 39 TULSA L. REV. 663 (2004). I have quoted this passage before, in Margaret Jane 
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If you know Frank, you can hear his voice here, as he declaims 
these questions, each one louder and more insistent than the one be-
fore, and you can hear the undercurrent of irony, and (I think) 
humor - at least bemusement - too. 
During my year at Harvard, Frank invited me to lunch a few 
times, as is customary for faculty members engaged with the process of 
trying to make visitors feel comfortable, which Frank certainly did. 
His counsel about how to navigate the shoals of Harvard was very 
valuable to me. We had lively discussions of legal theory, which was 
wonderful. The most amusing thing that happened during my visit 
took place at a Chinese restaurant in Harvard Square. When Frank 
opened his fortune cookie, it said, "This will be your final meal." I'm 
sure Frank has forgotten this episode, and indeed my memory is pretty 
hazy at this point. (But I don't think I'm clever enough to have made 
this up.) One thing I'm sure of is that Frank thought this amusing 
and curious. (I think it turned out that a jokester had infiltrated the 
cookie production facility from which the restaurant obtained its 
supply.) Luckily, fortune cookies don't really tell fortunes. (They 
aren't actually cookies, either.)3 
As Frank and I came to know each other, we found that we shared 
a deep love of music. One of my favorite recollections is that Frank 
quizzed me at a dinner party by playing "drop the needle." (This is a 
game where one asks the person being quizzed to identify the piece of 
music or the composer from the portion heard where the "needle" is 
dropped. Of course, this terminology relates to the bygone era before 
CDs.) The excerpt Frank played was clearly an art song, for voice and 
piano, in the tradition of the songs of Schubert, Schumann, and Men-
delssohn, but in the idiom of the later nineteenth century, and in 
English. I had an inspiration. I guessed that the composer was Sir 
Arthur Sullivan because I knew that Sullivan wrote "serious" music in 
addition to operettas and in fact wished that he could be remembered 
Radin, Property and Precision, 39 TULSA L. REV. 639, 645 (2004); in fact, this was an earlier Mi-
chelman appreciation essay. (Anytime appreciation of Michelman is the order of the day, I will 
show up.) In that essay, the 1ulsa Law Review was persuaded to reprint Michelman's piece so 
that it would be available online, after I said that to my mind it is possibly the best piece of prop-
erty theory published in the twentieth century. I said there (and still hope) that studying this piece 
might help restrain subsequent writers from assuming tragic commonses all over the place, or 
from assuming that more propertization is always better. It might also make us think about the 
proposition that propertization can create trustlessness rather than alleviate it. (By the way, Mi-
chelman in this essay also originated the term "anticommons.") 
3 A few years ago I put the cookie episode to its ultimate use by weaving it into a contracts 
exam. One of the characters got such a cookie with his takeout meal, and right after he opened it 
at home, he had a heart attack and wound up in intensive care. The question made students ad-
dress, inter alia, whether being in intensive care would be an excuse relieving someone of contrac-
tual duties. But the question also invited consideration of whether such a cookie would violate 
the implied warranty of merchantability. 
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for his "serious" music instead of operettas (though in fact his "serious" 
music is now all forgotten, while the operettas live on). Frank was sly, 
as well as musically erudite, and indeed amusing, in propounding this 
quiz. (I was right about Sullivan.) 
On the topic of what one is remembered for, something Frank and 
I have in common is that we receive obligatory cites for early pieces 
that became hits, with perhaps frustratingly less attention to later 
pieces that were (in my case) more mature, or (in Frank's case) about 
different and no less important topics. After his early hit with Proper-
ty, Utility, and Fairness, Frank could have stayed with welfare theory 
and usefully explored its nuances and combated its prevalent oversim-
plifications. But he didn't. He wrote about property using per-
spectives other than welfare theory. 
Frank also mastered other fields besides the one he first mastered. 
I am not a constitutionalist, and legal philosopher, and historian. But 
Frank is. He probably has the best understanding of anyone of how 
John Rawls's political theory might intersect with constitutional legal-
ism; and he is one of a very few law professors who have a thorough 
understanding of Jtirgen Habermas and the relationship of his com-
municative action theory to law. Moreover, unlike most legal academ-
ics of his age cohort, Frank has embraced globalization and made sig-
nificant contributions to constitutionalism in places and legal cultures 
other than our own. 
I seem to recall that Frank and I share, in addition to legal theory 
and music, a certain love of baseball. In fact, we might have had a 
Rawlsian discussion at one point about whether what is played in the 
American League should even count as baseball, because I argued that 
the use of designated hitters is not actually "baseball." Of course, with 
a Red Sox fan that would be a lively discussion. On a trip to Maine, I 
saw a bumper sticker that said, "I root for the Red Sox, and anyone 
who is playing the Yankees." That could be the sentiment of both of 
us. (Even though I tend to root for the National League, where they 
do play "baseball," I certainly root for anyone who is playing the Yan-
kees.) I'm pretty sure Frank is the one who introduced me, along with 
other visitors that year, to Fenway Park. I think I understand the en-
during significance of the CITGO sign. 
Frank's career at Harvard has lasted well beyond the time it took 
for the Red Sox to overcome the Curse of the Bambino and win the 
World Series. Frank has contributed indelibly to the education of 
thousands of practicing lawyers, as well as to several generations of le-
gal scholars. By his works he is specially honored and will continue to 
be. Thank you, Frank, for everything. 
